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On 24 April 1991 the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported
that Germany had decided to recognize the Federated States of Micronesia
(FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), two western
Pacific island nations freely associated with the United States (FBIS 1991).
Germany, the colonial master of both territories between 1899 and 1914,
made symbolic amends by becoming the first European state to proclaim
its intention to establish diplomatic relations with both nations. Well
before the German move, however, four foreign embassies had been
established in the Federated States and one in the Marshall Islands. Both
nations were admitted to the United Nations in September 1991. Stewart
Firth's argument that neither is sovereign (Firth 1989,75) can no longer be
sustained. A theory that accounts adequately for international recognition
of the two countries is needed.
The German breakthrough was by no means the principal milestone in
the two nations' campaigns to expand their presence in the international
community. That distinction belongs to the late 1986 joint declarations
between the United States and both states that the United Nations trustee-
ship agreement establishing the US-administered Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands was no longer applicable. The declarations concurrently
implemented the Compact of Free Association, a bilateral agreement
mutually binding the two nations and the United States. On 22 December
1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 683 (UNSC 1990), termi-
nating the trusteeship with respect to the Federated States of Micronesia
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Resolution 683 set the stage for
their admission to the United Nations.
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Diplomatic efforts of both nations nonetheless enjoyed significant suc-
cess prior to Resolution 683. Between 21 October 1986-the date of com-
pact implementation for the Marshall Islands-and 22 December 1990,
the Federated States and the Marshalls established diplomatic relations
with each other and with such diverse nations as the United States, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Chile, the Philippines, Israel, the People's
Republic of China, and numerous South Pacific states (Zdanovich 1991,
4). They also were admitted to the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, the South Pacific Forum, and the Asian Development Bank. Finally,
Australia, the Philippines, and China established embassies in the Feder-
ated States, joining US embassies in both nations.
It is tempting to ascribe these achievements to a dawning international
acknowledgment of the right to self-determination of the peoples of these
parts of Micronesia. The 14 to I Security Council vote to terminate the US
trusteeship over the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (ie, on Res 683)
illustrated overwhelming international support for their self-determina-
tion. And the statements welcoming the council's action, notably by the
People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet
Union, emphasized that the people of both nations and the Northern
Marianas had engaged in valid acts of self-determination (UNSC 1990).
This emphasis on self-determination, however, begged the question of
why so many nations had already recognized the two freely associated
states. Engaging in an act of self-determination does not inevitably lead to
sovereignty, as the case of the Northern Marianas, now a US common-
wealth, demonstrates. Numerous peoples and territories claiming the
right to self-determination have failed to attain international recognition.
The freely associated states would not have made such gains prior to the
UN Security Council trusteeship termination had there not been compel-
ling reason for other states to accept their international personalities.
This article explains why the Micronesian quest for international recog-
nition was successful. It discusses the origin of the concept of free associa-
tion; the Compact of Free Association; theories rejecting freely associated
state sovereignty; Micronesian sovereignty; Micronesian independence;
and the international relations of both nations. It concludes that the term
free association no longer accurately describes the relationships of the
Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
with the United States.
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The author argues instead, drawing upon Alan James's Sovereign State-
hood (1986), that the implementation of the compact revived the all-but-
forgotten status of "protected states," that is, sovereign nations that have
delegated part of their inherent powers to another nation. Furthermore,
the protected states known as the Federated States of Micronesia and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands are not only sovereign but independent,
despite the seeming limitations of the compact and its subsidiary agree-
ments.
FREE ASSOCIATION
Free association as a political status originated in a series of efforts by the
United Nations to encourage the transition of non-self-governing territo-
ries to self-governing status. These efforts took on special importance fol-
lowing World War II, when it was by no means clear that the victorious
European colonial powers would willingly relinquish their overseas pos-
sessions. In 1953, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 742 (VIII) to
clarify when article 73 of the UN Charter no longer required a colonial
power to report on non-self-governing territories. An annex listed the
"Factors Indicative of the Attainment of Independence or of other Sepa-
rate Systems of Self-Government" and identified three principal status
options: independence, what has come to be known as free association,
and integration into a metropolitan state.
That same day the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 748 (VIII)
recognizing "the association of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with
the United States of America has been established as a mutually agreed
association." Puerto Rico did not fit neatly into any of the three categories
established by Resolution 742, as pointed out by Clark. Resolution 748
nonetheless approved an end to US reporting on Puerto Rico under Article
73. The resolution was the first to recognize "association" as a status
(Clark 1980, 41-46).
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), known as the "Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (the
Declaration) and adopted on 14 December 1960, emphasized the desirabil-
ity of non-self-governing states becoming independent, as opposed to
attaining other possible statuses. As one observer noted, however, "The
Declaration can be read as permitting nothing short of independence and
is often so read by states which ignore a somewhat milder resolution
·.
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adopted the following day, Resolution 1541" (Clark 1980, 50). This com-
panion measure reaffirmed the acceptability of alternatives other than
independence. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (xv) made a renewed
effort to clarify when Article 73 reporting on non-self-governing territories
could be discontinued. It defined the option of free association in far
greater detail than did Resolution 742. The US government maintains that
Resolutions 1514 and 1541 must be read as a single document (UNGA 1989,
8), demonstrating the importance the United States attaches to the latter's
moderating influence on appeals to Resolution 1514.
The first two entities to become associated states under Resolution 1541
were the Cook Islands and Niue, until then non-self-governing South
Pacific island territories of New Zealand. The Cook Islands became freely
associated with New Zealand in 1965, on passage by its Legislative Assem-
bly of a resolution requesting "New Zealand in consultation with the
Cook Islands to discharge the responsibilities for the external affairs and
defence of the Cook Islands."
The New Zealand Parliament and the Cook Islands Parliament had
previously passed the Cook Islands Constitution Act of 1964, containing
the Cook Islands Constitution. According to Section 5 of the act, "Noth-
ing in this Act or in the Constitution shall affect the responsibilities of Her
Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand for the external affairs and
defence of the Cook Islands, those responsibilities to be discharged after
consultation by the Prime Minister of New Zealand with the Premier of
the Cook Islands." The UN General Assembly approved free association
for the Cook Islands in 1965 under Resolution 2064 (xx). Niue voters also
backed free association with New Zealand in a 1974 UN-observed referen-
dum. The General Assembly accepted the Niue results by passing Resolu-
tion 3285 (XXIX) (Clark 1980, 54-60).
The Cook Islands subsequently modified its constitution to assist in the
development of external relations (Aikman 1982, 89-91). New Zealand
itself has taken the position that "the exercise by the New Zealand Gov-
ernment of any responsibilities in foreign affairs or defence must be pre-
ceded by full consultation with the Cook Islands" (Aikman 1982, 93), in an
effort to facilitate recognition of the international personality of the Cook
Islands. 1
The United Kingdom, in contrast to the skillful New Zealand diplo-
macy at the United Nations, bungled a 1967 bid to decolonize several
Caribbean territories. The General Assembly voted overwhelmingly (86 to
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° with 27 abstentions) to refuse to terminate Article 73 reporting require-
ments for the United Kingdom with respect to five associated states estab-
lished under the West Indies Act of 1967. The General Assembly, however,
rejected the British failure to consult the United Nations in the decoloniza-
tion process (Clark 1980, 60-64), rather than the status of association
itself.
In 1970, the General Assembly, via Resolution 2625 (XXV), "The Decla-
ration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations," once again approved free association as a means of
achieving self-governing status. It went even further by including "the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people" as
an outcome as acceptable as independence, integration, or free association
(Leibowitz 1989, 507). This resolution in effect left it up to member states
to decide how to deal with emerging political entities.
How to handle associated states nonetheless continued to perplex sov-
ereign nations, multilateral organizations, and scholars. James Crawford,
author of a comprehensive examination of statehood and sovereignty,
observed, "It cannot simply be asserted that Associated States lack all
international status. They are clearly not separate independent States, but
equally they are not for international purposes merely part of the metro-
politan State." Crawford ultimately hedged that "the Associated State will
acquire substantial international personality" (Crawford 1979, 376-377).
The Cook Islands and Niue indeed have made significant progress in
establishing multilateral personalities, but their bilateral personalities are
far more restricted. Both are members of the South Pacific Forum (the
Cook Islands was a founding member in 1971) and the South Pacific Com-
mission. Although neither has been admitted to the United Nations, both
are associate members of the UN Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (Jonassen 1983, Appendix B). The Cook Islands also
has joined such specialized UN agencies as the World Health Organiza-
tion (USDS 1991, 325), the International Civil Aviation Organization (USDS
1991, 330), UNESCO, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (USDS
1991,317). On the other hand, the European Community rejected a Cook
Islands bid to accede to the Lome Convention between the European
Community and Asia-Caribbean-Pacific states (Aikman 1982, 93-94), a
decision yet to be reversed.
The Cook Islands and Niue have established bilateral ties with a num-
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ber of nations, primarily in the Pacific. The Cook Islands also has signed
several agreements with the United States (USDS 1991, SO-SI). Nonetheless,
as of early 1992 there were no foreign diplomatic missions in the Cook
Islands capital, Rarotonga, and only one consular office. Further ad-
vances in bilateral diplomacy are hindered by several factors: the retention
of New Zealand citizenship in lieu of establishing separate Cook Islands
or Niue citizenships (Aikman 1982, 88; Clark 1980, SS); the statutory vest-
ing of the foreign affairs power in New Zealand; and the small popula-
tion, remoteness, and relative economic insignificance of both states.
THE COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION
The experience of the United States in negotiating free association with its
only UN trust territory was bound to differ from the experiences of either
New Zealand or the United Kingdom. The United States perceived
Micronesia to be far more important to it strategically than the tiny
dependencies of New Zealand and the United Kingdom ever were to those
countries. The US military wrested the Micronesian islands from Japan in
World War II in a series of bloody battles that stiffened American resolve
never again to permit them to be used against US forces. The United
States drafted and subsequently ratified a UN trusteeship agreement
(UNSC 1947) giving itself virtual carte blanche in military affairs. In bring-
ing the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands into existence in July 1947,
however, that agreement also foreclosed any US claim to sovereignty over
Micronesia, (Sayre 1948, 271), except for the restored US Territory of
Guam. This renunciation laid the foundation for the emergence of
Micronesian sovereignty and independence.
Among the eleven post-World War II trusteeships established by the
United Nations, only the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was desig-
nated a strategic trusteeship. The trusteeship agreement permitted the
United States to station military forces and construct fortifications within
the trust territory, as well as to restrict or deny access to it for security rea-
sons. It also allowed the United States to continue testing atomic weap-
ons. The testing had already begun in July 1946 with a series of nuclear
explosions at Bikini Atoll, reflecting US unwillingness to delay the
achievement of vital national goals pending entry into force of the trustee-
ship. The United States cemented control over the Trust Territory by
..
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ensuring that all strategic trusteeship issues were handled by either the
Security Councilor the UN Trusteeship Council. The United States has a
veto in the former, and, together with France and the United Kingdom,
controlled the latter.
Negotiations over a post-trusteeship relationship between the United
States and the Trust Territory began in 1969, over twenty years later. The
Trust Territory then embraced six districts: Palau, Yap, the Northern
Marianas, Truk, Ponape, and the Marshalls. From the start the Northern
Marianas had favored a closer relationship with the United States than the
other districts. Aspirations in the Northern Marianas for political integra-
tion with the United States culminated in 1975 in the "Covenant to Estab-
lish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union
with the United States of America" (US Statutes at Large 90, 263). The
covenant took effect, except for the Northern Marianas' incorporation
into the United States, on 9 January 1978.
The remaining portions of the Trust Territory followed a very different
path. Kusaie (now Kosrae) Island, formerly part of Ponape (now Pohnpei)
District, became a separate district on I January 1977. Palau and the
Marshall Islands entered into separate political status negotiations with
the United States after failing in 1978 to ratify a constitution drafted by
delegates from all districts of the trust territory. Yap, Truk (now Chuuk),
Ponape, and Kusaie districts ratified the constitution, thereby uniting into
the present Federated States of Micronesia. Palau and the Marshall
Islands gained their own governments after ratifying constitutions in sepa-
rate plebiscites.
After over a decade of negotiations, US, FSM, and RMI officials ini-
tialed a draft Compact of Free Association in 1980 (Leibowitz 1989, 646).
The Federated States of Micronesia and the United States signed the com-
pact and a host of subsidiary agreements in 1982. The Marshall Islands
followed suit in 1983. FSM and Marshall Islands voters approved the com-
pact in separate UN-observed plebiscites in 1983. Somewhat confusingly,
the same compact applied to both countries, although the accompanying
bilateral subsidiary agreements were individually tailored.
Following US congressional approval of the compact, President Reagan
proclaimed the trusteeship no longer applied to the Federated States as of
3 November 1986, or to the Marshall Islands as of 21 October 1986. The
FSM and RMI governments issued their own declarations of nonapplica-
310 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1993
bility (see NU, 28 Feb 1987, 4, for the FSM proclamation). President
Reagan's proclamation also incorporated the Northern Marianas into the
United States as of 12:01 AM on 4 November 1986. The joint declarations
of nonapplicability by the United States, the Federated States, and the
Marshall Islands, in contrast, implemented the Compact of Free Associa-
tion.
The declarations of nonapplicability were controversial because the
United States did not seek UN Security Council approval. Article 83 of the
UN Charter empowered the council to exercise "All functions of the
United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the
terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amend-
ment ..." The US government instead addressed the issue in the Trustee-
ship Council, an organ of the UN General Assembly. The Trusteeship
Council approved the US move in advance by passing Resolution 2183
(LIn) on 28 May 1986. The United States assured the council that it did not
consider its action a unilateral termination. According to a US official
who served from 1987 to 1990 with the US delegation to Trusteeship
Council meetings, where the United States reported on social and eco-
nomic progress in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands:
It was our [the US] contention that [the declaration] fell within the preroga-
tives of the administering authority to administer the territory any way it saw
fit including the granting of full self-government under the status agreements
without actual termination of the Trusteeship Agreement by the Security
Council. ... [W]e took the position that since there was no termination pro-
cedure established for the strategic trust, and our obligation was to promote
self government etc (art. 76 [of the UN Charter]) we were simply honoring our
trust responsibilities by granting full self government and lifting the applica-
tion of the Trusteeship Agreement as appropriate to the governments con-
cerned. (McPhetres 1991)
The compact departs from the form of free association pioneered by the
Cook Islands and Niue by reserving foreign affairs to the FSM and RMI
governments. It follows those precedents by vesting defense authority in
their partner, that is, the United States. Section 3II of Title Three-Secu-
rity and Defense Relations-of the compact obliges the US government to
defend the Federated States and the Marshall Islands as if they were part
of the United States. Section 3II also empowers the United States to deny
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access to or the use by third-nation military forces of FSM and RMI facil-
ities and gives the United States the option to establish and use military
facilities in both nations (us I987a, 99 Stat I822).
These responsibilities and privileges are reconciled with the foreign
affairs capacities of both nations by Section I23 of Title One-Govern-
mental Relations: "In recognition of the authority and responsibility of the
Government of the United States under Title Three, the Governments of
the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia shall consult,
in the conduct of their foreign affairs, with the Government of the United
States" (us I987a, 99 Stat I802). Contrary to Gary Smith's sweeping asser-
tion that "the Micronesian governments are required to 'consult' with the
US government in the general conduct of their foreign affairs" (Smith
I99I, 97), this obliges the freely associated states to consult on foreign
affairs only in the context of security and defense matters. The compact,
including sections 3II and I23, can be terminated unilaterally or by mutual
agreement under sections 44I, 442, or 443 of Title Four (us I987a, 99 Stat
I829)·
Those who question FSM and RMI sovereignty tend to focus not on the
compact itself, but on the subsidiary mutual security agreements with the
United States. The mutual security agreement between the Federated
States of Micronesia and the United States ("Agreement Between The
Government of the United States and The Government of the Federated
States of Micronesia Regarding Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Security Concluded Pursuant to Sections 32I and 323 of The Compact of
Free Association" [us I987a]) provides for mutual consultation in the
event of a threat to the political independence of the signatory govern-
ments or to their mutual security in the Pacific. It also contains a direct US
security commitment to the Federated States.
For its part, the Federated States of Micronesia pledges to consult
before permitting any third country access to or use of its facilities by mili-
tary personnel or for military purposes. The Federated States agrees that
the US government has the authority and responsibility to foreclose such
access or use based upon its sole determination, unless both governments
agree on such access or use. The Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
United States concluded a similar subsidiary agreement ("Agreement
Between the Government of the United States and The Government of the
Marshall Islands Regarding Mutual Security Concluded Pursuant to Sec-
312
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tions 321 and 323 of The Compact of Free Association" [us 1987b]). Unlike
the compact, these agreements can be terminated only by mutual agree-
ment.
THEORIES DISCOUNTING FSM AND RMI SOVEREIGNTY
The existence of continued formal ties between associated states and their
partners has led some scholars to question whether such states can be con-
sidered sovereign. Alan James, for example, asserts that if a supposedly
sovereign entity's constitution can be altered unilaterally by an outside
state, the former cannot be considered sovereign. He views sovereignty
not as a "bundle of attributes," admitting of degrees, but rather as an
either-or proposition that turns on the presence or absence of constitu-
tional independence.
James denies that associated states, even those responsible for their
external affairs, are sovereign entities. He argues that the agreements of
association can be terminated unilaterally by either side, "which means
that the constitution of the associated state can be altered in a fundamen-
tal way by an outsider." James also claims associated states are not sover-
eign because they were in "colonial subordination" prior to the agreement
of association (James 1986, 105).
Stewart Firth cites James in arguing that the mutual security subsidiary
agreements between the United States and the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands "create a right of per-
manent strategic denial in the area by the United States armed forces.
. . . The effect of the subsidiary agreements is that the Marshalls and the
Federated States may withdraw from the benefits but not from the costs
and obligations created by their political settlement with the United
States." According to Firth, "The Marshall Islands cannot terminate the
application of strategic denial by a constitutional amendment. In this
sense I assert the existence of a constitutional link between the United
States and Micronesia"-presumably both the Federated States and the
Marshall Islands (Firth 1989, 79).
Firth further argues that the joint declarations of nonapplicability of the
trusteeship improperly circumvented the required Security Council ap-
proval (1989, 80-81). Ironically, the Security Council, originally viewed as
the only sure means of protecting US interests in the trusteeship, became
an obstacle when the United States sought to help the Micronesian states
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obtain international recognition. The United States refrained from pro-
posing a Security Council resolution terminating the trusteeship because
the Soviet Union had indicated it would veto such an effort. This would
have had the disastrous effect, for both states, of seeming to reject their
claim to international standing.
The United States justified its failure to request Security Council ap-
proval for the declarations of nonapplicability by asserting that Article 83
does not specify how the strategic trusteeship would be terminated. The
US reasoning was taken with a grain of salt by such West European allies
as France and the United Kingdom, which declined to recognize either
nation in the absence of Security Council action. Firth claimed that the
standoff over the role of the Security Council left substantial doubt as to
the sovereignty of the two countries (1989,80-83).
Yash Ghai, a Pacific constitutional scholar, raised another objection.
He argued: "The constitutions [of the former trust territory districts] did
not require enactment by the US; on the other hand the [constitutional]
conventions were themselves the creation of the Congress of Micronesia,
which owed its existence to an Order of the United States. Thus the con-
stitutions do not pass the purist's test of autochthony, even though the
constitutions do not come into force unless approved in a referendum"
(Ghai 1985, 32).
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING FSM AND RMI SOVEREIGNTY
None of these reasons for refusing to concede the sovereignty of the
Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands is
valid. It is therefore not surprising that the two countries won interna-
tional recognition prior to the Security Council termination. James's insis-
tence upon constitutional independence as the touchstone of sovereignty is
not unreasonable; what is unreasonable is his presumption that the FSM
and RMI constitutions are not independent of the United States. Neither
was enacted by the United States Congress nor did the US government
draft, adopt, or amend them. Termination of the compact or any of its
subsidiary agreements would not alter either country's constitution,
although it could have a major effect on their finances. There is simply no
organic link between the constitutions of the two polities and the United
States. Nor can the trusteeship under which the freely associated states
were administered prior to compact implementation be equated to the
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"colonial subordination" that encourages James to reject the sovereignty
of associated states.
Firth's effort to posit a constitutional link based on the mutual security
agreements also fails to stand up under scrutiny. He asserts that the
Federated States and the Marshalls are constitutionally linked to the
United States because they cannot terminate the mutual security subsidi-
ary agreements by unilateral constitutional amendments. If that were the
case, however, then all nations that have signed treaties with one another
would be constitutionally linked. As James himself points out, treaties are
properly subject to termination only by mutual agreement (James 1986,
104). The inability to terminate treaties unilaterally thereby would deprive
all parties to such agreements of sovereignty-a reductio ad absurdum
demonstrating the argument's fallacy.
To the contrary, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of
the Marshall Islands can unilaterally terminate or breach treaties they
have signed, including the Compact of Free Association. The US Congress
certainly foresaw this possibility. It tried to discourage such actions with
respect to the compact by insisting upon the inclusion of clauses permit-
ting the United States, in the event of FSM or RMI noncompliance, to sus-
pend compact-mandated payments (us 1987a, 99 Stat 1793). Both nations
have the underlying capacity to act unilaterally-even against their own
best interests.
The most telling argument against the hypothesis that neither nation is
sovereign, however, has been the willingness of other nations to enter into
normal diplomatic relations with and establish embassies in both coun-
tries. Both nations successfully expanded their international personalities
in both multilateral and bilateral spheres prior to the trusteeship termina-
tion. Their diplomatic relations are expanding inexorably in the post-
trusteeship period. The theory that the mutual security agreements pre-
clude FSM and RMI sovereignty must be discarded because it cannot
explain these developments.
The debate over the role of the UN Security Council in terminating the
trusteeship became irrelevant with the December 1990 termination. In its
willingness to make the trusteeship nonapplicable prior to termination,
the United States tapped a deep well of sentiment in favor of self-determi-
nation that turned the declarations of nonapplicability into a diplomatic
success rather than a failure. The joint declarations-incorrectly labeled
at times as the "unilateral US termination" because they were neither uni-
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lateral nor a termination-advanced the cause of self-determination in the
course of implementing a political status currently extant nowhere else on
earth.
Yash Ghai slights the FSM and RMI constitutions because they were
drafted by conventions convened by an institution-the Congress of
Micronesia-established by the trusteeship administering power. This
objection, however, could be directed with equal force at the constitutions
of other Pacific states. For example, the Constituent Assembly of Papua
New Guinea that enacted the PNG constitution prior to independence
consisted of the members of the House of Assembly (Ghai 1985, 31) estab-
lished by the Australian colonial administration. FSM and RMI sover-
eignty is less tainted by constitutions drafted under the auspices of UN
trusteeship than the sovereignty of other nations is by constitutions
drafted under the auspices of colonialism.
MICRONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Since the principal objections to FSM and RMI sovereignty do not hold
up, whence does Micronesian sovereignty spring? Did the United Nations
-and prior to it, the League of Nations-exercise sovereignty, given that
neither the United States, nor its administrative predecessor, Japan, ever
asserted sovereignty over the Micronesian islands (Sayre 1948, 270-271;
Hills 1984, 590)? Or has sovereignty always resided in the Micronesian
people?
Referring to the pre-World War II League of Nations mandate system,
which included Japanese-mandated Micronesia, Sayre observed in 1948
that "little now is heard of the theory that sovereignty over the mandated
territories resided in the League of Nations." Sayre argued that the League
of Nations disappeared without transferring mandate responsibilities or
title to the mandated territories to the United Nations (Sayre 1948, 271).
The US government claimed in 1947 that the League of Nations' succes-
sor, the United Nations, could "properly represent that aspect [sover-
eignty] of the life of these islands" (McKibben 1990, 269, n63). This
hypothesis is equally questionable. The United Nations did not assert sov-
ereignty over the Micronesian islands in the trusteeship agreement with
the United States. Instead, it enjoined the United States "to provide the
status of citizenship of the trust territory for the inhabitants of the trust
territory" (UNSC 1947, Article II). This reflected UN intentions neither to
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assert sovereignty-as it could have, for example, by creating a common
UN citizenship for the inhabitants of all eleven post-World War II trustee-
ships-nor to permit administering powers to integrate their trust territo-
ries by conferring metropolitan citizenship. The trusteeships bestowed
international approval only for the administering powers to act as if they
were sovereign. Micronesian sovereignty therefore can be considered to
have lain "dormant" (McKibben 1990, 268, n59) during the trusteeship.
The Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands emerged from this dormant state when they gained the capacity to
enter into binding international commitments prior to the joint declara-
tions of nonapplicability of the trusteeship-specifically, when their con-
stitutions entered into effect: 10 May 1979 in the Federated States (Burdick
1988, 257), and I May 1979 in the Marshalls (RMI 1988, 48). Burdick
argues:
Indeed, it is important that the [FSM] Constitution was designed to come into
effect before the termination of the Trusteeship to ensure that the establish-
ment of a new political relationship with a foreign power would be done under
the authority of, and in conformity with, the Constitution. Thus, the Constitu-
tion's chronological precedence helps ensure its supremacy over international
agreements.
The referendum on the Constitution was therefore an act of self-determina-
tion of the most fundamental significance. For the first time in the modern era,
Micronesians asserted the existence of their sovereignty and identified its
locus. (Burdick 1988,259)
To be sure, some Micronesians had previously denied that their sover-
eignty depended upon any external colonial or administering powers. For
example, a group called Micronesian Independence Advocates-Hawaii
declared "Before any whiteman set foot on our islands, we were indepen-
dent and sovereign.... We declare that the sovereignty of Micronesia
has always resided in the people of Micronesia and we want our American
masters to acknowledge this non-negotiable and inalienable right" (MIAH
1971, I).
Burdick nonetheless correctly asserts that only the entry into effect of
the FSM and RMI constitutions created a locus for that sovereignty. The
constitutions thereby invested the Federated States and the Marshall
Islands with sufficient international personality to enter into binding
agreements such as the compact. This analysis is congruent with that of
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James. Sovereignty presupposes, according to James, a constitution, or
some document serving as one, independent of organic links to another
nation (James 1986,105). This is the case with both of the constitutions of
the freely associated states. The entry into force of the FSM and RMI con-
stitutions therefore was the point at which the two nations emerged as
sovereign entities, not the entry into force years later of the compact. The
compact undoubtedly is the single most important international agree-
ment those nations have ratified so far but, as former FSM President
Haglelgam has pointed out:
The Compact ofFree Association is not organic to Micronesian sovereignty. It
is not an instrument which transfers sovereignty to the Micronesian people. It
is a treaty, entered into by two co-equal sovereigns, and made effective, not
unilaterally, but by the constitutional processes of each. (Haglelgam 1990, 5-6,
italics in original)
It does not detract from Haglelgam's point to note that the compact and
its subsidiary agreements were not submitted in the form of a treaty to the
US Senate for its advice and consent, as prescribed by the US Constitu-
tion. Both houses of Congress instead approved them as a "Congressional-
Executive Agreement." The UN trusteeship agreement was approved in
1947 in the same manner (Hills 1984, 588). The US government considers a
treaty and executive agreement to impose equivalent international obliga-
tions (usc 1984,108).
Haglelgam also could have noted that the compact was the product of a
series of arduous and intense negotiations. The Micronesian side strug-
gled successfully to obtain US agreement, in Principle Three of the Hilo
Principles-adopted in Hawai'i on 9 April I978-that the proposed consti-
tution would be the supreme law of the new nation, rather than the com-
pact itself (Leibowitz 1989, 657-659). Similarly, the Micronesians gained
US agreement to vest the foreign affairs authority in the nascent nation,
rather than in the United States (Leibowitz 1989, 673-676). These strug-
gles lay to rest the canard that free association is a unilaterally imposed,
US government-dictated status.
The hypothesis that the Federated States and the Marshall Islands
gained their sovereignty when their constitutions entered into force faces a
more substantial challenge. The US Secretary of the Interior, prior to
devolving power to the new constitutional governments, reserved the right
to suspend laws, by implication including constitutional amendments,
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enacted by their legislatures (USDOI 1979, 28rr7). At first, this move seems
to have created, albeit indirectly, the "constitutional link" with the United
States asserted by Firth.
The United States, however, did not reserve any authority to alter, sus-
pend, repeal, or otherwise derogate the two constitutions. Moreover,
both nations have always been able to amend their constitutions by means
other than enacting laws (FSM 1982, c-16; RMI 1988, 43). The effect of the
reservation on the "constitutional independence" considered by James to
be at the heart of sovereignty therefore was only marginal. The reserva-
tion aimed not to cripple the fledgling governments, but rather to leave no
doubt that the United States retained the authority to continue fulfilling its
trusteeship obligations.
MICRONESIAN INDEPENDENCE
In contrast to the eventual US acknowledgment of Micronesian sover-
eignty, the United States consistently has viewed Micronesian indepen-
dence as a potential threat to its security interests. The initial US draft of
the 1947 trusteeship agreement focused only on "self-government" as a
goal for the development of the Trust Territory. Pressed by the Soviet dele-
gation to amend that phrase to "self-government or independence" the US
representative agreed, but declared "the United States feels that it must
record its opposition not to the principle of independence, to which no
people could be more consecrated than the people of the United States,
but to the thought that it could possibly be achieved within any foresee-
able future in this case" (Sayre 1948, 280-281; Clark 1980, 6-7).
This skepticism reappeared many years later in the US insistence that
the Federated States and the Marshall Islands avoid any mention of, or
even renounce, independence in documents defining their status in rela-
tion to the United States. For example, according to the second sentence
of the first Hilo Principle, "During the life of the agreement [of free associ-
ation] the political status of the peoples of Micronesia shall remain that of
free association as distinguished from independence" (Manhard 1979,73).
The preamble to the compact itself (us 1987a, 99 Stat 1800) omits any
mention of independence (referring only to "institutions of self-govern-
ment"), as do the preambles to the FSM and RMI constitutions. The US
government, in fact, agreed to negotiate an agreement of free association
only after the Micronesians first rejected an offer to become part of the
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United States. Free association must have seemed to offer the only alterna-
tive short of independence likely to gain international approval, despite
Resolution 2625 (XXV).
US officials have referred occasionally but only half-heartedly to the
Micronesian right to seek political independence (usc 1984,48). President
Reagan did not mention independence in his proclamation implementing
the compact or in subsequent congratulatory anniversary messages to the
Federated States of Micronesia. President Bush followed suit. The Depart-
ment of State adheres to this policy, although not without internal debate.
In a rare deviation from this otherwise consistent US approach, the sub-
sidiary mutual security agreements called for consultations in the event
"the political independence of either of [the signatory governments] or
their mutual security is threatened in the Pacific." US Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations Pickering came close to employing the "1-
word" in a statement delivered before the Security Council just prior to its
termination of the trusteeship. Ambassador Pickering declared, "I believe
we should move as well to recognize the clear wishes of 140,000 inhabit-
ants of the Marshalls and the Federated States of Micronesia, who them-
selves wish to have their status reviewed by the Council and seen to be
effectively that of States in free association with the United States, with
the capacity to act independently" (UNSC 1990, 7). The latter phrase could
presage a fundamental shift in US terminology.
The United States' hesitation to employ the term independence in rela-
tion to the freely associated states exasperates the Micronesians, who have
laid claim to independence since the beginning of free association. FSM
President Nakayama, for example, proclaimed the compact implemented
on behalf of the Federated States on 3 November 1986 with the words "we,
the free and independent people of the Federated States of Micronesia
... now enter into free and voluntary association with the United States
of America in accordance with the Compact of Free Association" (NU, 28
Feb 1987, 4).
Given its cautious approach toward the status of the freely associated
states, the United States originally expected neither entity to qualify for
UN membership. The executive branch responded to a 1984 congressional
inquiry by noting, "In the view of the United States, the Freely Associated
States, while having sovereignty and full self-government, will not possess
the attributes of independence called for in the eligibility criteria of the
United Nations Charter" (usc 1984, 109). An executive branch official
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predicted the plenary US authority for defense and security matters would
deprive the two nations of the "attributes of statehood sufficient for
admission to the U.N. under the criteria established in Article 4(1) of the
Charter" (usc 1984, 50).
Notwithstanding this rather pessimistic assessment, the US government
had already committed itself in Section 122 of the compact to support
freely associated state membership in regional and international bodies-
the latter presumably including the United Nations-but only "as may be
mutually agreed." The United States indeed responded positively when the
Federated States of Micronesia decided to seek UN membership following
the Security Council trusteeship termination (Haglelgam 1991, 13). It
could hardly have reacted otherwise, given its professed goal of promoting
"international recognition of the Freely Associated States by all countries
of the world, assisting them in overcoming barriers to their recognition
erected by some countries in the U.N. context" (USDS 1990, 8). The United
States therefore supported the FSM and RMI applications to become UN
members that culminated in their September 1991 admission.
The United States, in contrast, has steadfastly resisted the FSM desire
to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty. The Federated
States indicated its support for the SPNFZ Treaty in 1985 (NU, 15 Aug 1985),
the year members of the South Pacific Forum opened it for signature. The
SPNFZ boundaries deliberately excluded Micronesia so as to maximize the
chances of US ratification of the SPNFZ Treaty protocols. The treaty's Arti-
cle XII, however, set out the procedures by which the SPNFZ can be
expanded upon accession by Forum members north of the equator, clearly
anticipating the inclusion of the Federated States and the Marshall
Islands.
President Haglelgam indicated publicly that the Federated States of
Micronesia was considering signing the SPNFZ Treaty in November 1989
(Mangnall 1989). Such a move, however, would require prior consultation
with the United States under both the compact and the mutual security
subsidiary agreement. The United States itself has declined to ratify the
protocols attached to the SPNFZ Treaty. As long as the United States main-
tains this attitude, it is unlikely to agree to FSM or RMI accession to the
SPNFZ. Conversely, US government concurrence in accession by the freely
associated states would signal a possible shift in US attitudes toward sign-
ing the protocols.
The Federated States is unlikely to initiate the consultations required
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under the compact to accede to the SPNFZ Treaty without prearranged
agreement from the United States because an American rebuff-which
could not be kept quiet-would impair its claim to political independence.
The Federated States is even less likely to sign the SPNFZ unilaterally, given
the crisis in relations with the United States such a move would provoke.
The Federated States would like to use SPNFZ accession to shake off
doubts about its independence once and for all. The compact and its
subsidiary agreements, however, as voluntarily agreed to, subject the
Micronesian signatories to potentially heavy economic penalties for
engaging in unilateral foreign policy moves affecting US defense responsi-
bilities.
FSM AND RMI INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands developed strong bilateral ties with other nations following the
joint declarations in 1986. Australia and New Zealand were among the
first to deal with them, albeit cautiously. Australia sent the first foreign
diplomat to present his credentials in Kolonia, but termed its representa-
tive, the consul-general in Honolulu, a "Minister," rather than an ambas-
sador (NU, 15 July 1987, I). New Zealand appointed a representative (NU,
June-July 1988, I).
To a degree, both nations followed the US lead. The compact initially
provided that the United States and the two states would exchange resi-
dent "representatives" rather than ambassadors. The United States, the
Federated States, and the Marshalls remedied this confusing terminology
in 1989 by amending the compact to change the titles of their diplomatic
emissaries to ambassador. The first and last US representatives in Kolonia
and Majuro, respectively, were Michael G. Wygant and Samuel B.
Thomsen. 2
Australia and New Zealand eventually accredited ambassadors to the
Federated States and the Marshalls, and Australia set up a resident
embassy, all prior to the Security Council trusteeship termination. The
Australian foreign minister visited both nations in July 1989 and FSM
President Haglelgam paid his first state visit to Australia. The determina-
tion of the Australian and New Zealand governments to establish cordial
relations with the two new Pacific nations impelled both to act sooner
rather than later.
*M5
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The West Europeans, less keenly interested in Pacific Island affairs and,
in some instances, opposed to the US failure to seek Security Council
approval for its declaration of nonapplicability, deferred opening diplo-
matic relations but retained a watching brief. For example, the Swiss
ambassador to South Korea visited the Federated States of Micronesia in
August 1987, the British high commissioner to Kiribati met President
Haglelgam in September 1987, the Netherlands ambassador to the Philip-
pines followed suit in April 1989, and the French "deputy Consul General"
in Honolulu visited in August 1989 (NU, var). Diplomatic officials of
twelve nations and the United Nations attended the dedication, on 3
November 1989, of the new FSM national capital at Palikir, Pohnpei
Island (King 1989, 2).
The Federated States and the Marshalls also intensified their participa-
tion in multilateral organizations after the compact was implemented.
Both were admitted to the South Pacific Forum as full members in 1987
(NU, 15 June 1987, 2); to the International Civil Aviation Organization in
1988 (ICAO 1989, 20); and to the Asian Development Bank in April 1990
(ADB 1990, 12). The Federated States signed the South Pacific Allied Geo-
science Commission (SOPAC) constitution in October 1990 (NU, 30 Nov
1990, 6), joining the Marshall Islands as a founding state. All these steps
occurred prior to the December 1990 Security Council termination.
The Federated States of Micronesia ratified the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
as well as two UN drug conventions, again prior to the Security Council
action. United Nations bureaucrats were reluctant to accept its ratifica-
tions for deposit, however, absent a clear resolution of its status by the
Security Council. The United Nations is likely to accept these instruments
now that both nations have become members.
PROTECTED STATES
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the Federated States of Microne-
sia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands were treated as sovereign
states and assumed a number of the obligations associated with sover-
eignty prior to the Security Council trusteeship termination. The principal
remaining issue is to what extent they can be termed independent. Their
publicly proclaimed status as freely associated states does not shed much
light on the question. The international personalities of the Cook Islands
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and Niue, also nominally associated states, are not nearly as substantial as
those of the Micronesian nations. To place all four entities in the same cat-
egory confuses, rather than clarifies, their status.
James's description of the nineteenth-century status of "protected
states"-not to be confused with the more subservient status of "protec-
torates"-better describes the relationship of the Federated States and the
Marshalls to the United States than the term freely associated states.
According to James,
a protected state ... not only is constitutionally independent before it
assumes that status-as is indicated by the fact that it becomes a protected
state by way of an international treaty; it also persists in that condition thereaf-
ter, as the independence of its constitution is unaffected by the treaty of protec-
tion. It has not become part of a wider constitutional setup but has just entered
into a rather special treaty relationship with another state. From which it may
be concluded that it remains a sovereign state-and a fully sovereign one at
that, there being no half measures in this sphere. It has voluntarily chosen to
restrict the exercise of its sovereign rights in a certain area, allowing another to
act on its behalf. But in respect of areas not covered by the treaty of protection
it retains its complete freedom of action and, if appropriate, may make treaties
on such matters. It may also be open to a protected state to exchange diplo-
mats with other sovereign states, a practice which "historically ... has been a
common occurrence." (James 1986,100-101)
James cites as examples of prior protected states Tunisia and Morocco vis-
a-vis France; Korea vis-a-vis Japan; and Zanzibar, Bahrain, the Trucial
States, and Tonga vis-a-vis the United Kingdom.
The Federated States and the Marshall Islands deserve to be considered
protected states because they voluntarily accepted certain restrictions on
their sovereign powers by entering into the Compact of Free Association
with the United States; they retained constitutionally independent govern-
ments after compact implementation; they have exercised their latent
capacity to exchange diplomats with other nations; and they have been
recognized by other nations and international organizations. Admission
to the United Nations confirms the international consensus as to their sov-
ereignty.
Protected states are independent as well as sovereign by virtue of the
way James defines sovereignty. According to James, sovereignty entails
constitutional independence. By qualifying the noun independence with
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the adjective constitutional, James converts an otherwise amorphous con-
cept into a manageable criterion. His insistence that sovereignty is not a
bundle of attributes amounts to a rejection of all other criteria. This rejec-
tion clears the way for James to conclude that it is possible to determine
unequivocally whether an entity is sovereign or not. Ironically, however,
James's refusal to acknowledge degrees of sovereignty supports the pro-
posal that there are degrees of independence.
This follows because the achievement of constitutional independence,
and consequent admission to the family of sovereign nations, does not free
a state of all limitations. No state-not even the most powerful-can be
considered totally independent. All sovereign nations are subject to a wide
array of restrictions on their ability to act, including both those assumed
voluntarily (such as treaties, alliances, and international agreements) and
those imposed by external realities (such as aid dependency, balance-of-
trade deficits, and hostile neighbors). Conversely, no sovereign state,
however constrained, entirely lacks independence. The moiety of indepen-
dence enjoyed by a sovereign state renders it competent both to enter into
diplomatic relations with other states and to sign international agree-
ments. In the case of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic
of the Marshall Islands, for example, both became competent to sign the
Compact of Free Association with the United States once their constitu-
tions entered into force.
Perceptions about whether a polity is constitutionally independent fre-
quently determine whether it will be afforded the opportunity to establish
diplomatic ties or to sign international agreements. Even James's presum-
ably clear test can falter when confronted by such borderline entities as the
Cook Islands and Niue because international actors may hold varying per-
ceptions of their status. The Cook Islands and Niue have been treated as
sovereign in a number of contexts, but could obtain greater recognition by
renouncing New Zealand citizenship or rescinding their delegation of
authority over external affairs to the government of New Zealand.
Although sovereign since 1979, both Micronesian states extended what
Ambassador Pickering termed their "capacity to act independently" by
assuming the status of protected states. First, the declarations of nonappli-
cability ended the chilling effect of the trusteeship upon FSM and RMI
diplomatic relations. According to the theory just elaborated, the fledgling
FSM and RMI governments could have established relations with other
states once their constitutions entered into force in 1979. Such ties never
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developed because the United States would have opposed them as
encroaching on US responsibilities.
Second, the joint declarations ended the potential for the United States
to suspend FSM and RMI legislation. As noted above, before devolving
authority to the two governments established under the new constitutions,
the US Secretary of the Interior decreed that the laws of each nation would
not take effect if suspended by the trust territory high commissioner. The
declarations vacated this order.
Finally, the joint declarations implementing the compact inaugurated
separate citizenships for residents of the respective portions of the trust
territory. There are those who attempt to minimize the importance of this
development. McKibben, for example, argues that because the compact
bestowed the "essential benefits" of US citizenship on FSM and RMI citi-
zens, the only difference between the Federated States, the Marshall
Islands, and the US Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is
the degree of US control over foreign affairs (McKibben 1990, 275). This
argument does not hold water. The compact permits FSM and RMI citi-
zens to live and work in the United States, but thereby waives only a hand-
ful of the thirty-odd grounds for exclusion under US immigration law.
The US government retains, and from time to time has exercised, its
authority to prevent FSM or RMI citizens from entering or remaining in
the United States, thus drawing a clear line as to the benefits accorded citi-
zens of those jurisdictions. Citizens of both nations are entitled to an array
of US government-provided benefits under the compact. Eligibility for
such benefits, however, cannot be equated to US citizenship except under
the most mercenary interpretation. The establishment of separate citizen-
ships undoubtedly helped convince foreign states and multilateral organi-
zations to accept the two jurisdictions as sovereign.
CONCLUSIONS
Those who argue that the Federated States of Micronesia and the Repub-
lic of the Marshall Islands will never be sovereign until the mutual security
subsidiary agreements are terminated must account for the continually
expanding recognition accorded to the two nations since the 1986 declara-
tions. Those who claim the two nations became sovereign only upon the
Security Council trusteeship termination in 1990 must explain the success-
ful development of their international personalities prior to termination.
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And those who date FSM and RMI sovereignty to the implementation of
the compact in 1986 must justify how the compact can have any legitimacy
if entered into by nonsovereign entities. The hypothesis that the two
nations became sovereign upon the entry into effect of their constitutions,
in contrast, provides a rationale for both the legitimacy of the compact
and the rapid development of their respective international relations fol-
lowing compact implementation.
Palau (also termed the Republic of Belau)-the sole remaining portion
of the Trust Territory-is now in a position analogous to that of the Fed-
erated States and the Marshalls prior to the declarations of nonapplicabil-
ity. It gained a locus of sovereignty by adopting a constitution, but the
United States continues to assert the right to suspend laws enacted by the
Palauan legislature (USDOI 1979, 28II7, superseded by USDOI 1990, 43223).
The US government nonetheless is bound by the trusteeship agreement to
"promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward
self-government or independence" (UNSC 1947, Article 6). The restrictions
on Palau eventually will be lifted, as they were for the Federated States
and the Marshalls, whether Palau becomes a protected state or not.
As for the Federated States and the Marshall Islands, the US govern-
ment may accede to their desire to be termed independent, if they
acknowledge that such terminology does not affect their obligations under
the compact. The status of each as protected states could prove as evanes-
cent as the trusteeship. The annual grants provided to the two nations by
the United States under the compact will come to an end in 2001. The
compact parties are to begin negotiating whether to extend this assistance
beyond its original fifteen-year term on I October 1999. 3 Islander expecta-
tions for substantial continued aid, however, may be disappointed should
no new strategic threats arise in the post-Soviet Pacific. The parties could
eventually conclude that the mutual obligations established by the com-
pact are no longer in their respective national interests. If so, these two
protected states ultimately may shed their chrysalis to reappear before the
international community in less exotic guise.
THIS ARTICLE was originally prepared for a course at the University of Hawai'i
while the author was an MA candidate in Pacific Islands Studies, and was subse-
quently presented at the December 1991 Pacific Islands Political Studies Associa-
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tion conference in Melbourne, Australia. The author (a US Foreign Service offi-
cer) served at the US Embassy in Kolonia, Pohnpei, Federated States of Microne-
sia, from 1988 to 1990. The views expressed here are solely those of the author
and should not be taken to represent the position of the United States Department
ofState or the United States Government.
Notes
I A more recent statement by the government of New Zealand, obtained by
the author in early 1992 from the Ministry of External Relations and Trade, fur-
ther clarifies New Zealand's views on the status of the Cook Islands:
Statement Presented to UNESCO by the New Zealand Government,
October 1989
The Cook Islands is neither a colony nor a dependent territory. Nor, however, is it a
sovereign independent state as that concept is traditionally understood in international
law. It falls into a special category of which the Cooks and Niue are perhaps the only
members. It is an associated state with full control over its own destiny in matters relat-
ing to both domestic and external affairs.
By virtue of its constitution the Cook Islands has full legislative competence over all
its affairs. Consequently the constitutional relationship existing between New Zealand
and the Cook Islands is best understood by making an analogy with a partnership. The
common elements of this partnership are the shared legal personality at international
law, the same Head of State and citizenship. As in a partnership each partner has cer-
tain responsibilities toward the other partner to ensure the continued existence of the
partnership. But each partner can if it wishes withdraw from the partnership at any
time.
The constitutional relationship provides for the exercise by New Zealand of certain
responsibilities for the defence and external relations of the Cook Islands. However,
this does not confer upon the New Zealand Government any rights of control. All legis-
lative and executive powers, whether in these fields or any other, are vested exclusively
in the Government of the Cook Islands and the exercise by the New Zealand Govern-
ment of any responsibilities in foreign affairs or defence must be preceded by full con-
sultation with the Cook Islands. In carrying out these responsibilities the New Zealand
Government is in effect acting on the delegated authority of the Cook Islands Govern-
ment. ...
It is important to stress not only that the Cook Islands has full constitutional capac-
ity to conduct its own external relations and to enter directly into international arrange-
ments and agreements but that in fact they do directly conduct certain aspects of their
external relations....
Capacity at international law has always depended upon "recognition"-that is,
· "
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upon willingness of one state to take notice of and deal with another. It is clear that in
recent practice many states, particularly those in its own region, have been willing to
deal directly with the Cook Islands and accordingly to accept that the Government of
the Cook Islands can exercise some of the attributes of sovereignty and engage interna-
tional responsibility [sic] in its own right.
2 For the record, the Department of State determined that Wygant and Thomsen were
"of equivalent rank to Ambassadors" while bearing the title of Representative, per US State
Department telegram number 343368 (1989).
3 The compact mandates that negotiations to extend provisions of the compact
expiring on its fifteenth anniversary, that is, provisions relating to economic assistance (99
Stat, 1813-1814), begin on the thirteenth anniversary (99 Stat, 1818). The "Agreement
Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Federated States
of Micronesia Regarding Implementation of the Compact of Free Association" (US 1987a),
however, established that the anniversary of the effective date of the compact would fall
each year on I October. The negotiations on economic assistance therefore are to begin on
I October 1999.
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Abstract
International recognition of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic
of the Marshall Islands as sovereign entities accelerated following the UN Secu-
rity Council termination of the US-administered UN trusteeship over them in
December 1990. However, both states had already established substantial inter-
national personalities prior to the Security Council action. The governments of
the United States and both nations declared the trusteeship "non-applicable" to
both in 1986, concurrently with the entry into effect of the Compact of Free Asso-
ciation. The two nations subsequently established diplomatic ties with such
diverse countries as Israel, the People's Republic of China, Australia, and numer-
ous South Pacific neighbors, and joined a variety of international organizations,
all prior to the termination. The declarations of nonapplicability were a diplo-
matic success, not a failure. The two entities gained loci of sovereignty when their
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constitutions went into effect in 1979. The newly established constitutional gov-
ernments exercised their sovereignty in concluding the compact with the United
States. By delegating the power of defense to the United States under the com-
pact, the two nations became modern-day "protected states," that is, states that
have voluntarily ceded part of their sovereign powers to another nation. As pro-
tected states, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands can be considered not only sovereign but independent, despite the seeming
limitations of the compact and its subsidiary agreements.
